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T
he use of antimicrobials has 
caused a proliferation of 
resistant pathogens (Figure 1), 
and most worryingly, some bacterial 
strains are resistant to multiple classes 
of drugs [1,2]. Policies are now being 
implemented to reduce antimicrobial 
use, with some encouraging successes 
[3,4]. However, here we argue that 
current policies may only partly solve 
the problem. In particular, they do 
not address the conundrum at the 
heart of antimicrobial resistance: the 
solution may ultimately require us 
to put society before the individual. 
That is, halting the rise of resistance 
may only be achievable if some 
patients go untreated. We defend this 
uncomfortable conclusion using the 
logic of the well-known social dilemma 
“the tragedy of the commons” [5]. 
More data on the societal costs of 
resistance are required to evaluate the 
potential for a tragedy of antimicrobial 
resistance and the moral dilemma that 
it would present.
In the late 19th century, pioneering 
microbiologists laid the foundations 
of germ theory, which became one of 
the most powerful explanations for 
epidemic disease [6,7]. It was quickly 
understood that chemical substances 
that kill microbes could defeat 
infectious diseases. In the middle 
of the last century, an apparently 
endless stream of newly developed 
antimicrobial compounds, most 
famously penicillin, left the impression 
that humanity had established 
superiority over the microbial world 
once and for all [7]. But it has since 
emerged that this is far from the truth 
[3,7,8]. For decades, we have created 
an environment where any pathogens 
that can survive antimicrobial 
treatment have a strong selective 
advantage. The result has been the 
proliferation of resistant strains [6,7] 
and the origin of bacteria resistant to 
multiple antibiotic classes [1,2]. 
Antimicrobial chemicals are 
frequently used where they are not 
needed. For example, antibacterials 
are often prescribed for viral infections 
[3,4,8] and the widespread availability 
of over-the-counter antimicrobials in 
many countries can result in ineffective 
self-medication [8]. Large volumes 
of antimicrobials are also used in 
agriculture and veterinary medicine 
[9,10], and in many consumer products 
in which they do not always have 
a documented function [11]. The 
emergence of antimicrobial resistance, 
therefore, can be greatly slowed by 
reducing inappropriate antimicrobial 
use [4,12] and considerable efforts are 
currently underway to promote this 
goal. These include the development 
of guidelines [13], and educating 
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Figure 1. A Cutaneous Knee Abscess Caused by MRSA
MRSA is resistant to many common antibiotics, making it difﬁ  cult to treat.
(Photo: CDC/Bruno Coignard/Jeff Hageman)
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physicians and the public about best 
practice [3,4,8]. Another priority is to 
develop improved diagnostic tools that 
allow rapid identiﬁ  cation of pathogens 
and the appropriate antimicrobial 
treatment [12]. The pressing need 
for these programs is clear. However, 
here we argue that they do not address 
a conundrum that is central to the 
problem of resistance. Protecting the 
effectiveness of antimicrobials may only 
be possible if we put society before the 
individual. 
The Potential for Tragedy
Antimicrobial use presents a dilemma 
[14]. Appropriate use can beneﬁ  t 
individual patients but carry a cost to 
societal health by selecting for resistant 
strains that are difﬁ  cult to treat [15] 
(Figure 2). Baquero and Campos [16] 
recently argued that this dilemma 
mirrors what Hardin termed “the 
tragedy of the commons” [5,17–19]. 
Hardin’s phrase refers to common land 
to which many people have rights. Every 
herdsman knows that putting too many 
cows upon a pasture will eventually 
destroy it by overgrazing. However, 
when pastures are a shared commons, 
the beneﬁ  t of adding a cow goes 
entirely to the owner (the individual) 
but all herders share the cost (society). 
The rational solution for an individual 
is to keep adding cows, even though 
this leads to the deterioration and 
possible collapse of the pasture, at a 
large cost for all [5,17–19]. 
Hardin applied this analogy to the 
problems of overpopulation, shared 
ﬁ  sheries, and taxation [5]. Baquero 
and Campos [16] have argued that 
the similarity to the problem of 
antimicrobial resistance means that we 
can make use of reputation effects to 
limit antimicrobial prescription (i.e. if 
overprescription is seen as damaging 
to the reputation of the doctors), 
as discussed below. What is most 
important for our discussion, however, 
is Hardin’s key insight that a tragedy of 
the commons lacks a technical solution, 
which he deﬁ  ned as “one that requires 
a change only in the techniques of 
the natural sciences, demanding little 
or nothing in the way of change in 
human values or ideas of morality.” This 
insight is important because the current 
campaign to ensure that antimicrobials 
are only used where they will work is 
such a technical solution. This campaign 
is very important and will help to slow 
the evolution of resistance, but Hardin’s 
argument indicates that we may need to 
go further. Protecting the antimicrobial 
commons, and hence the collective best 
interest, may require society sometimes 
to act against an individual patient’s best 
interests (Figure 2A).
Clearly, any policy that acts against a 
patient’s interest should be a last resort 
and would raise serious ethical concerns 
that need careful consideration [14,20]. 
That said, the importance of restricting 
diagnostic and therapeutic options 
to patients is already well understood 
by general practitioners who are 
increasingly obliged to divide medical 
resources among patients along ﬁ  rm 
budget lines [18,21]. The unfortunate 
reality is that individuals do not always 
receive the full extent of the treatment 
that they desire. 
But what would putting society ﬁ  rst 
mean for antimicrobial use? This is 
not yet clear. In the best-case scenario, 
the individual and societal optima 
for antimicrobial use will turn out to 
be similar, and the current focus on 
stopping inappropriate use [3,4,8] 
will indeed be sufﬁ  cient (Figure 2B). 
However, if it emerges that what is 
good for society is markedly different 
to what is good for the individual, then 
society will beneﬁ  t from reductions in 
use beyond those currently planned 
(Figure 2A). That is, society will beneﬁ  t 
from further reductions in the number 
of times that each patient takes a 
course of antimicrobials in order to 
limit evolutionary selection for resistant 
strains. Such reductions might include 
severe limits on the use of new and 
broad-spectrum antimicrobials [14], 
or leaving milder, mostly self-limiting 
bacterial infections untreated. In the 
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Figure 2. Is Antimicrobial Resistance a Tragedy of the Commons? 
(A) Tragedy scenario. A simple model that illustrates the potential for moral dilemma in 
antimicrobial use. Optimizing antimicrobial use (u) for the good of all requires consideration of 
both society and the individual patient. (i) Individual health beneﬁ  t from antimicrobial use I(u). 
(ii) Cost to societal health from decreased effectiveness of antimicrobials E(u) as a result of the 
evolution of antimicrobial-resistant pathogens. We assume that the societal beneﬁ  t from reducing 
transmission rates is small and do not include it here. iii) Overall effect of antimicrobial use on 
societal health S(u) = I(u)E(u). Ensuring that antimicrobials are only used for infections they can treat 
is a technical solution that will only take us to the individual optimum, which in this illustrative 
example is far from the real optimum. 
(B) Best-case scenario. Low to moderate antimicrobial use has little impact on our ability to treat 
later infections and is only weakly costly to societal health E(u). This means there is no tragedy. The 
true nature of E(u) is unknown but it is a function of investment in both new antimicrobials and 
infection control, which may be able to shift us from scenario A to scenario B.PLoS Medicine  |  www.plosmedicine.org 0179
extreme case that we face a complete 
loss of antimicrobial effectiveness, 
some antimicrobials might be reserved 
only for dangerous and potentially life 
threatening infections. 
Is Antimicrobial Use a Tragedy 
of the Commons?
Understanding just how far 
antimicrobial use should be restricted 
is a major challenge for the future. The 
problem is that the optimal solution 
of a tragedy of the commons requires 
a clear idea of the relative costs and 
beneﬁ  ts to both the individual and 
society [17] (Figure 2), and it is here 
that large gaps in our knowledge exist 
[15,22]. While we have an idea of 
what the cost to a patient is for leaving 
an infection untreated, we need to 
better understand the beneﬁ  ts, which 
are likely to include leaving gut ﬂ  ora 
unharmed [8,13] and reducing the risk 
of resistance in later infections [4,8,23].
More data on the societal effects of 
antimicrobial use are also required 
to understand the potential for a 
tragedy of antimicrobial resistance 
[15,22]. Antimicrobial use by a patient 
can beneﬁ  t others by preventing 
the pathogen being passed on but 
also carries the cost of promoting 
resistance [6,7]. And while it is clear 
that antimicrobial use increases the 
frequency of resistant strains that 
cause casualties [2], the full impact 
of resistance upon society is still 
poorly understood [15,22]. Although 
challenging, attempts to assess the 
societal costs of resistance will be 
helped by the strong differences in 
antimicrobial use between countries 
[24], which means that the effects 
of resistance can be monitored in 
communities with differing levels 
of use (Figure 2Aii). Agricultural 
studies may also provide valuable 
data, because a strategy that leaves 
animals untreated raises fewer ethical 
concerns than an equivalent strategy 
in our own society. The case for strong 
reductions in human antimicrobial use 
would be strengthened by evidence 
from agriculture that such reductions 
greatly prolong their effectiveness. 
Furthermore, any reductions in 
agricultural antimicrobials may have 
a knock-on beneﬁ  t in reducing the 
incidence of resistant strains in human 
infections [9,10].
A better understanding of the 
costs and beneﬁ  ts of antimicrobial 
use, therefore, is a highly desirable 
goal for future research. However, 
it should also be emphasized that 
public policy can affect the severity 
of societal costs and the basis for any 
tragedy of antimicrobial resistance 
(Figure 2). Until now, we have been 
able to avoid many health effects of 
resistance through the development of 
new antimicrobial compounds [1,2]. 
Unfortunately, development by private 
ﬁ  rms is decreasing rapidly as the 
discovery of new compounds becomes 
more and more challenging [1], and 
consequently, ﬁ  nancially costly. And 
these costs are set to increase as the 
campaigns to limit antimicrobial use 
further reduce proﬁ  ts from the sales of 
new compounds [14]. The impact of 
resistant strains on society, therefore, 
can be reduced by policies that 
promote antimicrobial development 
such as government investment in 
public-private partnerships [2,25] and 
the careful use of patents [26–28]. 
Another strategy that can reduce the 
health impact of resistant pathogens 
is hospital infection control, where 
a resistant pathogen is carefully 
monitored and targeted for special 
contact isolation and decontamination 
measures in a “search and destroy” 
policy [29–31]. This strategy has 
resulted in some notable successes 
with outbreaks of methicillin-resistant 
Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) [31] 
(see Figure 1) and vancomycin-resistant 
enterococci [29], but it cannot contain 
the spread of resistance outside of 
institutions and, like development 
of new drugs, the strategy comes at 
considerable economic cost [32,33]. 
So while it is clear that investment in 
development and infection control 
will play an important role in reducing 
the health impact of resistance (Figure 
2Aii), it is less clear that these strategies 
will eliminate the basis for tragedy 
altogether. We may, therefore, have 
to face up to the reality of a tragedy of 
antimicrobial resistance (Figure 2A).
Could Further Restrictions 
in Antimicrobial Use Be Achieved?
The recent campaigns to discourage 
antibiotic use for common colds and 
to limit antibacterials to bacterial 
infections have met with success, 
but they also underline the difﬁ  culty 
in changing society’s attitudes and 
behavior [3,4]. If further restrictions 
were deemed appropriate, could these 
be achieved? Here we might again 
turn to Hardin, who proposed two 
candidate solutions to a tragedy of the 
commons: “mutual coercion mutually 
agreed upon,” and privatization. 
However uncomfortable, in the event 
that antimicrobial use must be further 
restricted, both might play a role.
Coercion in society frequently takes 
the form of taxation, such as the use 
of parking fees when space is limited 
[5]. Similarly, prescribers or patients 
might be offered the choice of paying 
an antimicrobial-use levy or instead 
using alternative remedies. Coercion 
might also be achieved through new 
government regulations, which have 
already proved effective at reducing 
antimicrobial use in several countries 
[34]. More local regulation can be 
achieved by exploiting the preexisting 
management structures that exist in 
many health care settings to ensure 
that medical resources are divided 
equally [8,21]. Privatization solves the 
tragedy of the commons by dividing 
up the resource so that costs from 
selﬁ  shness feed back directly upon the 
individual owner [5]. But antimicrobial 
effectiveness cannot be divided in 
this way, making true privatization 
impossible. However, by analogy, 
careful tracking of antimicrobial 
prescriptions would create a feedback 
that enables individuals to be held 
accountable for extremes of use. 
Hardin’s solutions to a tragedy of the 
commons assume that humans behave 
as selﬁ  sh, rational individuals who—if 
unmanaged—will display no regard for 
the interests of society. Although there 
is no doubt that humans are capable of 
selﬁ  shness, this assumption of rational 
“Homo economicus” behavior is being 
increasingly challenged [19,35–37]. 
For example, increased cooperativity 
is predicted whenever selﬁ  shness is 
damaging to reputation [19,37], and 
Baquero and Campos have argued that 
antimicrobial use will be decreased 
if we can establish a context in which 
overprescription is damaging to the 
reputation of doctors [16].
In addition, studies in which 
participants are asked to divide up 
shared resources show that humans 
behave less selﬁ  shly than simplistic 
self-interested strategies predict. This 
highlights the importance of human 
norms for cooperation [19,36]. If these 
norms translate to health care decisions 
(although it is not certain that they 
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will), then educating patients about 
societal beneﬁ  ts will help decrease 
antimicrobial use [4]. The power of 
any societal argument is likely to be 
greatest when beneﬁ  ts accrue on a local 
scale [14]. Local beneﬁ  ts are realistic 
given the strong regional effects of 
differences in antimicrobial use and 
resistance, which suggest that reducing 
antimicrobial use can beneﬁ  t a region 
or nation even if its neighbors adopt a 
less effective program [38]. 
Conclusion
Hardin’s tragedy of the commons 
has proved to be a powerful analogy 
for understanding the problem of 
protecting the beneﬁ  t we all receive 
from public goods [5,17–19,36]. 
It ﬁ  nds particular relevance in the 
growing crisis of antimicrobial 
resistance, where use of antimicrobials 
threatens to undermine the protection 
they provide to society as a whole. 
The questions of how far to reduce 
antimicrobial use, and at what cost to 
individual patients, represent a central 
unanswered problem in the battle 
against resistance (Figure 2). The 
answer requires a better understanding 
of the effects of antimicrobial use 
on both the individual patient and 
society as a whole. In particular, we 
need to better understand the societal 
costs of resistant pathogens and the 
potential for investments into new 
antimicrobials and infection control 
to limit these costs. These empirical 
challenges exist alongside the ethical 
question of whether we should ever 
resort to a strategy that leaves patients 
untreated. It is the challenging task of 
physicians, public health agencies and 
governments to evaluate the severity of 
the situation and decide what should 
be done. Perhaps the strongest message 
from Hardin’s analogy is that difﬁ  cult 
choices may lie ahead [5,18]. Solutions 
to a tragedy of the commons do not 
come easily and are likely to require 
brave policy decisions.  
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